In the case, Galloway sued Greece, claiming that the town, by opening its monthly meeting with a prayer, created an unconstitutional "establishment of religion."
The town did not prescribe or approve the prayers to be said. A town employee simply called ministers listed in a directory, until one volunteered (without pay) to say the opening prayer.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that the town's practice was permissible and did not constitute an unconstitutional First Amendment violation. The court relied on its 1983 precedent in Marsh v. Chambers.
"In Marsh ... the Court found no First Amendment violation in the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a chaplain paid from state funds."
The court then explained its holding in Marsh.
"Marsh is sometimes described as 'carving out an exception' to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, because it sustained legislative prayer without subjecting the practice to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally structured' this inquiry. ... The Court in Marsh found those tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause. The First Congress made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official chaplains, and both the House and Senate have maintained the office virtually uninterrupted since that time. ...
"When Marsh was decided, in 1983, legislative prayer had persisted in the Nebraska Legislature for more than a century, and the majority of the other States also had the same, consistent practice. ... Although no information has been cited by the parties to indicate how many local legislative bodies open their meetings with prayer, this practice too has historical precedent ... 'In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.'"
In short, the legislative opening prayer was sustained because the very Congress that had just passed the First Amendment during that same session began the practice of opening its sessions with an opening prayer said by a paid chaplain.
Obviously, if they felt that the practice amounted to an improper "establishment of religion," they wouldn't have done it.
"That the First Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains only days after approving language for the First Amendment demonstrates that the Framers considered legislative prayer a benign acknowledgment of religion's role in society."
But while the Greece court sustained the legislative prayer practice, it did add a caveat:
"Yet Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation. The case teaches instead that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted "by reference to historical practices and understandings."
On the other hand, the court instructed that the "content of the prayer (opening legislative sessions) is not of concern to judges," provided "there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."
The court further explained, and rejected the plaintiff's argument that public prayers must be "non-sectarian."
"Our Government is prohibited from prescribing prayers to be recited in our public institutions in order to promote a preferred system of belief or code of moral behavior (Engel v. Vitale). It would be but a few steps removed from that prohibition for legislatures to require chaplain to redact the religious content from their message in order to make it acceptable for the public sphere. Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic reference to the sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.... 'The suggestion that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.'
"The government may not seek to define permissible categories of religious speech. Once it invites prayer into the public sphere, government must permit a prayer-giver to address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to be nonsectarian."
The court then gave guidance as to what has been historically typical legislative prayer.
"It is thus possible to discern in the prayers offered to Congress a commonality of theme and tone. While these prayers vary in their degree of religiosity, they often seek peace for the Nation, wisdom for its lawmakers, and justice for its people, values that count as universal and that are embodied not only in religious traditions, but in our founding documents and laws."
Rejecting the notion that some citizens might find such prayer offensive, or compulsive, the court said, "Our tradition assumes that adult citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith."
Finally, the court indicated it would look to see that the entire body of the prayers offered -- rather than a single prayer -- was consistent with how legislative prayers have been done traditionally.
"Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation. Marsh, indeed, requires an inquiry into the prayer opportunity as a whole, rather than into the contents of a single prayer."
Space limitations prevent me from doing more than summarizing the opinion. But I think the reasoning in this case could be of great importance in other areas of constitutional law.My thoughts on the importance of the case will follow.
Posted Online: June 21, 2014, 11:00 pm - Quad-Cities Online
by John Donald O'Shea
Copyright 2014
John Donald O'Shea