On Nov. 9, 2022, a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed by the states’ attorneys from 66 of 102 Illinois counties. Their petition for summary judgment alleged that Public Act 101-652, and how it was enacted, were in flagrant violation of the Illinois Constitution, and the act should be stricken as void in its entirety.
In December 2022, a judge in Kankakee County declared certain portions of the “so-called” Illinois Safe-T Act unconstitutional. The ruling dealt with portions of the Act limiting the power of judges to impose “cash bail” on those arrested for various criminal offenses.
The state then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court issued a stay of the lower court ruling, and heard arguments from the opposing sides in March 2022.
The 62 prosecutors put forth six arguments. I will address only two; they should be dispositive.
First: Because the act is not limited in scope to the “criminal law” even under a generous reading, it violates the single-subject clause set forth in Article IV, Section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution, and is void in its entirety.
The argument is that “reforming bail” is “criminal in nature.”
A state law pertaining to “whistleblowing,” applicable to 7,000 units of Illinois local government, isn’t “criminal in nature.” Nor is a law expanding the “Treatment Act” to other first responders. Nor is an act specifying how penitentiary prisoners must be counted for the purpose of determining representative districts. Nor is granting the attorney general increased powers to pursue civil actions, etc. for the court of claims.
The gist of the argument is this: “The “plain language of the act addresses multitudes of subjects with no natural or logical connection to criminal law. “
On this argument alone, the 62 prosecutors should win. Otherwise, the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution is a nullity. If they prevail on this argument, the court would not need consider the remaining arguments, because the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when the law violates the single subject clause, the entire law is struck down.
The argument is that “reforming bail” is “criminal in nature.”
A state law pertaining to “whistleblowing,” applicable to 7,000 units of Illinois local government, isn’t “criminal in nature.” Nor is a law expanding the “Treatment Act” to other first responders. Nor is an act specifying how penitentiary prisoners must be counted for the purpose of determining representative districts. Nor is granting the attorney general increased powers to pursue civil actions, etc. for the court of claims.
The gist of the argument is this: “The “plain language of the act addresses multitudes of subjects with no natural or logical connection to criminal law. “
On this argument alone, the 62 prosecutors should win. Otherwise, the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution is a nullity. If they prevail on this argument, the court would not need consider the remaining arguments, because the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when the law violates the single subject clause, the entire law is struck down.
Second: By eliminating monetary bail and by creating a myriad of rules and strictures that severely restrict the exercise of judicial discretion to consider and assign appropriate weight to the most germane facts, the General Assembly encroached upon the inherent functions of the judiciary and violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution in Article II, Section 1.
Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution provides: “The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” The Illinois Supreme Court has held that if “power is judicial in character, the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising it. Judicial power is that which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens and to that end construes and applies the law.”
Legislative enactments undermining the “traditional and inherent” powers of the judicial branch, particularly, those restricting judicial discretion, violate the Separation of Powers Clause.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that “matters concerning court administration” fall within the inherent power of the judiciary, and the legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”
The Illinois Supreme Court has specifically held that bail is “administrative” in nature, and that the court has independent, inherent authority to deny or revoke bail to “preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”
The Supreme Court has held that the trial court had inherent discretion to hold the defendant in custody even though he was eligible for bail under the Illinois Constitution.
In Elrod, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the court has the ultimate authority in determining the appropriateness of bail. The defendant in Elrod was charged with non-capital murder and held without bail, even though the Illinois Constitution at the time imparted a right to bail to “all persons ... except for capital offenses.” The court began its analysis by stating:
“In our opinion, the constitutional right to bail must be qualified by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the conduct of the proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when such action is appropriate to preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”
Although Public Act 101-652 does grant very limited authority to the court to enforce its pretrial release orders through sanctions, this does not cure the legislative overreach into the inherent powers of the judiciary. 725 ILCS 5/110–6. The legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”
The Illinois Supreme Court held that even though the Juvenile Court Act made no provision for the bail of an allegedly delinquent minor, the court had inherent power to set bail.
Since its beginnings, (in medieval England) the concept of bail has always involved money – whether cash, collateral, credit, or the conditional promise of payment by a surety. Requiring a “bond with sufficient sureties is premised on the assumption that economic loss to the accused, his family or friends, will assure his appearance for trial.”
Acting as a surety must involve some threat of loss and, accordingly, bail bonds secured by cash deposit or stocks and bonds equal in value to the bail are constitutional. Determining appropriate surety to compel the appearance of a defendant is a judicial, not a legislative function.
Argument two standing alone should also be dispositive of the case. I can’t imagine any judiciary ceding its constitutional authority and discretion to control bail to any legislature.
My prediction is that the trial judge will be affirmed.
Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution provides: “The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” The Illinois Supreme Court has held that if “power is judicial in character, the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising it. Judicial power is that which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens and to that end construes and applies the law.”
Legislative enactments undermining the “traditional and inherent” powers of the judicial branch, particularly, those restricting judicial discretion, violate the Separation of Powers Clause.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that “matters concerning court administration” fall within the inherent power of the judiciary, and the legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”
The Illinois Supreme Court has specifically held that bail is “administrative” in nature, and that the court has independent, inherent authority to deny or revoke bail to “preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”
The Supreme Court has held that the trial court had inherent discretion to hold the defendant in custody even though he was eligible for bail under the Illinois Constitution.
In Elrod, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the court has the ultimate authority in determining the appropriateness of bail. The defendant in Elrod was charged with non-capital murder and held without bail, even though the Illinois Constitution at the time imparted a right to bail to “all persons ... except for capital offenses.” The court began its analysis by stating:
“In our opinion, the constitutional right to bail must be qualified by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the conduct of the proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when such action is appropriate to preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”
Although Public Act 101-652 does grant very limited authority to the court to enforce its pretrial release orders through sanctions, this does not cure the legislative overreach into the inherent powers of the judiciary. 725 ILCS 5/110–6. The legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”
The Illinois Supreme Court held that even though the Juvenile Court Act made no provision for the bail of an allegedly delinquent minor, the court had inherent power to set bail.
Since its beginnings, (in medieval England) the concept of bail has always involved money – whether cash, collateral, credit, or the conditional promise of payment by a surety. Requiring a “bond with sufficient sureties is premised on the assumption that economic loss to the accused, his family or friends, will assure his appearance for trial.”
Acting as a surety must involve some threat of loss and, accordingly, bail bonds secured by cash deposit or stocks and bonds equal in value to the bail are constitutional. Determining appropriate surety to compel the appearance of a defendant is a judicial, not a legislative function.
Argument two standing alone should also be dispositive of the case. I can’t imagine any judiciary ceding its constitutional authority and discretion to control bail to any legislature.
My prediction is that the trial judge will be affirmed.
First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on May 30, 2023.
Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea
Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea