Religious 'Free Exercise" vs. Discrimination

What happens when one person’s First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, free speech or freedom of association run head-on into a second person’s First Amendment rights? Or when one person’s free exercise of religion results in discrimination against that second?

That is what the furor is over Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The gay community fears that a business owner, operating a “place of public accommodations,” could as part of his right to freely exercise his religion, discriminate against a gay couple by refusing to cater the gay couple’s wedding. As such, the gay community and others have objected to the Indiana RFRA.

In enacting the federal RFRA, Congress recognized that laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.

It provided that “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the substantial burden to the person -- is in furtherance of a ‘compelling governmental interest;’ and is the ‘least restrictive means’ of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

State RFRAs track federal law.

Unquestionably, the concern with discrimination is real. But protestors have selected the wrong target. The bottom line  is this: When the government legislates “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” (e.g., to outlaw “invidious discrimination”), if that legislation substantially burdens the free exercise of a person’s religion, the government must choose the “least restrictive means” of achieving its interest. But least restrictive, at least to me, presupposes an alternative. What if there is no “alternative”? In such a case, it seems the RFRA provides no guidance.

Assume, hypothetically, that the owner of a pizzaria in Nowheresville, Ind., believes gay marriage is sinful, and that in catering a gay wedding he would make himself complicit in sin. Can he be compelled to do so? If not, isn’t he discriminating against the couple? Is there a middle ground?

The U.S. Supreme Court case of Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian ... of Boston (1995) -- a rare unanimous Supreme Court opinion — probably provides the best answer that can be found.

In Hurley, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council organized and conducted the annual St. Patrick’s Day Parade. In 1992 a number of gay, lesbian and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants formed GLIB to march in the parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals. The council refused to admit GLIB. It sued and prevailed in all Massachusetts state courts.

“GLIB did not claim the council’s action amounted to ‘state action’ that denied them ‘equal protection of the laws’ in violation of the 14th Amendment.”

In that regard, the Supreme Court noted, “the guarantees of free speech and equal protection guard only against encroachment by the government” and “erect no shield against merely private conduct.”

The court then explained how 1st Amendment rights of the participants are implicated by a parade.

“Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches.

“Our cases have recognized that the First Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so) ... wearing an arm band to protest a war ... displaying a red flag ...  and even ‘marching, walking or parading’ in uniforms displaying the swastika.”

The court then acknowledged the state’s competing interest in preventing discrimination.

“The Massachusetts public accommodations law under which respondents brought suit has a venerable history.

“At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who ‘made profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.

“... the rule was that ‘the innkeeper is not to select his guests; he has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants.”

The court then noted the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute “does not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content, the focal point of its prohibition being rather on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods ...  and services on the proscribed grounds.”

Nevertheless, the court held that the Council’s collective 1st Amendment rights prevailed over GLIB’s  similar 1st Amendment collective rights, and its right not to be discriminated against.

“All speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid. ... One important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’

“The Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.

“The message it disfavored (GLIB’s) is not difficult to identify.”

The Court then noted:

“On its face, the object of the (anti-discrimination) law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public accommodations what the old common law promised to any member of the public wanting a meal at the inn, that accepting the usual terms of service, they will not be turned away merely on the proprietor’s exercise of personal preference.

“(But) When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own.”

As such, the question seems to be whether the celebration of the gay marriage in my hypothetical  amounts to “expressive activity.” If the ceremony amounts to “expressive activity” or “advocacy of a cause,” the pizzaria owner probably can, as a matter of freedom of religion, speech and association, decline to associate himself with the ceremony -- just as he could decline to march in a gay rights parade. But if the marriage amounts simply to a private exchange of vows, rather than “expressive activity” in support of a cause, the gay couple may well prevail.

Posted Online:  April 24, 2015 11:40 pm - Quad-Cities Online

by John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

It's Not America's Religious Freedom Laws Which Have Changed

To understand the intent of Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ("RFRA") it is useful to view it side-by-side with earlier federal and Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.

The RFRA was passed by Congress in 1993 to protect the free exercise of religion in America. Here are the Congressional findings as to the need for the law:

1. The Famers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;

2. Laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;

3. Governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;

4. In Employment Division v. Smith, (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and

5. The compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.


Congress then stated its purposes in passing the act:

1. To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert  and Yoder, and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and

2. To provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.


Congress, then provided

a. In general: Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection(b) of this section.

b. Exception: Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -- 1. is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2. is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

c. Judicial relief: A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.


In 1998, Illinois passed the  Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Illinois Legislature stated its purposes:

1. To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Yoder, and Sherbert, and to guarantee that a test of compelling governmental interest will be imposed on all State and local ... laws ...  and governmental actions ... in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.

2. To provide a claim or defense to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by government.

The Illinois Legislature virtually copied the Federal Act.

“Free exercise of religion protected. Government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Then, to guarantee compliance with the act, the Legislature again copied the federal act, but added a provision for attorney’s fees to allow a person whose “free exercise” was trampled by the state to hire an attorney to vindicate his rights.


So what did the original Indiana Act say that has caused all the furor? How is the Indiana Act different from the federal act and/or the Illinois act?

Here’s what the Indiana Law provided:

“Sec. 8. a. Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

“Sec. 9. A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened ...  by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation ... as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding.”
A following section allowed the victim of an undue state burden to sue for declaratory relief, injunction, compensatory damages and/or attorneys fees.

The federal and Illinois statues were passed to protect the citizen and other persons  in the “free exercise of their religion” as guaranteed by the First Amendment against the enforcement of “neutral laws” that “substantially burden” the “free exercise of religion” unless there was a “compelling state interest” involved, and unless the “least restrictive means” of furthering that compelling governmental interest were employed.

When the federal and Illinois laws were passed, there was no uproar. Nobody for a minute thought that the purpose of the laws was to allow people to discriminate against anybody.

The purpose of the Indiana law was the same. But times have changed. Now a law passed for the express purpose of keeping government from unnecessarily burdening the “free exercise of religion” is viewed as allowing discrimination against certain individuals rather than as protecting religious freedom.

In my next op-ed I will explore the worrisome danger of “religious freedom” degenerating into “invidious discrimination.”

Posted: Saturday, April 18, 2015 11:00 pm, QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea 

Religion: Congress vs. the US Supreme Court

Indiana and Arkansas recently have passed Religious Freedom Laws. There has been a fierce negative reaction. This piece is not about those laws. Rather, it discusses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) passed by Congress in 1993, in one of its most lucid moments, rejecting the Oregon v. Smith holding of the U.S. Supreme Court. 

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof  ...”  

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a person has an “absolute right” under the “establishment clause” to hold whatever religious beliefs he desires. But the “free exercise” of religion is not unlimited.  For example, you have an absolute right to believe that  “cannibalism ” is the “true religion.”  “Free exercise” of your religion does not allow you to boil and eat your neighbor’s children.

The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the RFRA, and a subsequent piece of Congressional Legislation, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) extensively in its 2014 Hobby Lobby decision.

“Congress enacted RFRA ... in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.   RFRA’s enactment came three years after this Court’s decision in ... Oregon v. Smith, ... which largely repudiated the method of analyzing free-exercise claims that had been used in cases like Sherbert and Yoder ... ”

The court then explained why Congress got involved.

“In determining whether challenged government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, (Sherbert and Yoder) used a balancing test that took into account whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government interest.”

Sherbert involved an employee who had been fired for refusing to work on her sabbath. The court held that she could not be denied unemployment benefits… In Yoder, the court held that Amish children could not be required to comply with a state law demanding that they remain in school until the age of 16. Recognition had to be given to the fact that their religion required them to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their formative adolescent years.”

But then In Oregon v. Smith, the court rejected “the balancing test set forth in Sherbert.” Smith concerned two members of the Native American Church who were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. When they sought unemployment benefits, the State of Oregon rejected their claims on the ground that consumption of peyote was a crime, but the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, held that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.

The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, and rejected its own “Sherbert balancing test,” holding “the Sherbert test -- whenever a person objected on religious grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable law -- “would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”

The Smith court then set out a new test. “Under the First Amendment, “neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”

Congress appalled, responded to Smith by enacting RFRA. It first found:

“Laws that are 'neutral' toward religion,” ... “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”

Then to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, Congress legislated that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” ... If the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person --  (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Then, not satisfied with later Supreme Court decisions, Congress again intervened, passing the RLUIPA to insure that an “expansive” rather than a “restrictive” definition was given to the term “free exercise of religion.”

“In RLUIPA -- in an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law -- Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”… 

 Indeed, Congress mandated that “free exercise”  “be construed in favor of a broad protection of  religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”

So, why am I writing about the two federal laws when the furor is about Indiana and Arkansas laws? In a future piece I propose to compare/contrast the new state laws with RFRA.

Posted: Saturday, April 9, 2015, 11:00  pm - QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

'Sales Tax Increase Won't Give Schools 'the Best'

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"I think they had already decided what they were going to do before they had their public meetings.” --  Michelle Anderson (lives on 7th Street, opposite Hamilton School, after a Moline School Board meeting)

                          

A year ago, a special interest group calling itself YES Makes Cents for Students, and the Moline District 40 School Board, lobbied the public to pass a 1 percent sales tax referendum that would have dumped $11.5 million into the districts' coffers, with the sales-pitch “our kids deserve the best.”

In March 2014, 55.78 percent of the voters flatly refused to impose the 1 percent sales tax. A similar referendum had failed in 2009.

Refusing to take "no" for an answers, YES Makes Cents for Students, and the county school board have once again forced the issue onto this year’s April 7 ballot:

“Shall a retailers’ occupation tax and service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a 'sales tax') be imposed in The County of Rock Island, Illinois, at the rate of 1 percent to be used exclusively for school facility purposes?”

The hope is, this being a municipal election -- with a lower turnout expected --  the "no" voters will stay home, and the “yes” people -- the tax increase supporters -- will make a point of getting to the polls.

So why does Moline need a 1 percent sales tax increase for “school facility purposes?”

Could it have anything to do with the fact that it is spending -- without first seeking voter approval via referendum  -- $17.3 million to “renovate” Hamilton school, cramming the project down the throats of the objecting neighbors?

Moline District 40 just sold Ericsson School for $50,000, and Garfield School for $75,000! Ericsson was a 22,912-square-foot facility built in 1969. It was sold for $2.18 per square foot. At the same time, the “renovated” Hamilton “super school” will be a 69,000 square foot. facility with a of cost $250 per square foot. The net loss is two school buildings and $17.15 million!

Superintendent David Moyer earlier told the voters that the $17.3 million cost of “the project will not affect the current tax rate. Once Ericsson and Garfield elementary schools close and their students start at Hamilton Elementary, the district will save a minimum of $350,000 annually.”

It appears, however, that he failed to mention that the $17.3 million expansion would create a  “need” for the district to try and ram through a 1 percent perpetual sales tax increase -- i.e., a tax increase each and every year! And if we do indeed save the promised $350,000 per year, it will only take 50 years for the voters to break even and  to get back the $17.3 million spent.

So what will the taxpayers get for their $17.3 million? Here’s Mr. Moyer’s description:

The Hamilton "project includes a new entrance and front office area with updated security; a two-story, horseshoe-shaped addition connected to the existing building; a circular, two-story addition with an open space school officials are calling the 'Imaginarium;' a new commons/lunchroom area; a music classroom that can be opened and used as a stage; a gymnasium; a new playground; and a new driveway and parking lot.

Here are some pertinent facts: Moline District 40 enrollment was 7,493 in the 2013-2014 school year. Total governmental fund revenues for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014 were $87,676,046.  Total governmental funds revenues increased $1,769,135 or 2 percent from the previous year. Total governmental funds expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014 were  $99,118,747.

The district states “its operating expenditures per pupil were $9,853.97.” But if the total  funds expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 were $99,118,747, as there were 7,493 students, the “governmental fund expenditure” was $13,228 per student.

Compare those facts with facts contained in the Alleman High School 2013-14 Annual Report.

Total Operating Fund Revenues: $2,991,284

Total Operating Fund Expenses: $2,981,910

Alleman 2013-2014 enrollment: 464 students

Alleman is therefore spending $6,727 per student, while Moline District 40 is spending either $9,853 or $13,228 per student.

The student to teacher ratio at Alleman is 17:1. The average class size at Moline is 25.

Students meeting or exceeding ACT Readiness Benchmark Report:

-- Alleman: 66 percent

-- State of Illinois: 44 percent

-- United Township High School: 28 percent

-- Rock Island high School: 23 percent

-- Moline: 48 percent

Average 2014 ACT Scores:

-- Alleman: 23.6

-- Illinois Quad-Cities: 18.8

Percentage of students who will attend college/universities:

Alleman: 98 percent

Moline: 63 percent

Maybe instead of pushing tax increases, which hurt every taxpayer and business in Rock Island County, perhaps its time to take note of what Alleman is doing, and how it is doing it. Maybe if your “kids really do deserve the best,” perhaps its time to send them to Alleman.

(The 2013-14 Moline Budget appears at: molineschools.org/budget/14_15/CAFR%20Moline%20School%20District%2014%20Final.pdf. The Alleman 2013-14 Annual Report appears at: allemanhighschool.org/editoruploads/files/1314%20annual%20report.pdf)

Posted: Saturday, March 20, 2015 am - QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

Posted: Friday, March 20, 2015 11:00 pm By John Donald O'Shea

How Congress made itself irrelevant

The Constitution of the United States gives Congress enormous power.

So how does America end up with a feckless Congress? If Congress is supposed to be a coequal branch of government, how did this happen? Take a look at just some of the great powers given to Congress in the Constitution.

-- “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”

-- “To regulate commerce ... among the several states.”

 -- “To coin money, regulate the value thereof."

-- “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."

-- “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes ... to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.”

-- “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”

-- “No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law,:

So, how does a Congress which is given power to make all the laws, regulate commerce, coin all money, levy all taxes, appropriate, and to make all laws necessary and proper for the execution of its enumerated powers as well as the powers vested by the Constitution in the government and departments, end up feckless and servile?

First, Congress delegates its powers. Second, Congress accedes to presidential encroachments upon its powers.

In the late 1800s,  Congress began delegating its powers to a fourth branch of government”  -- administrative agencies --  a branch nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.

In doing so, Congress acted pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, conjoined with its power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its commerce power. This process of creating agencies apart from the traditional departments of government began in 1887, when Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Subsequently, it created the Federal Trade Commission (1914), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the National Labor Relations Board (1935) and the Environmental Protection Agency (1970). 

Other independent agencies made part of the Executive Department now include the Food and Drug Administration, (now part of the Department of Health and Human Services), the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the Federal Energy Regulation Agency (now both parts of the Department of Energy), and the IRS (Treasury) .

In almost every case, Congress has delegated to these administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulations  with the force of law to further the public interest, public convenience, or public necessity. The result has been tens of thousands of pages of regulations, by which the agencies have “legislated” down to the minutest detail.

Congress has been relieved of the duty of writing legislation, and in the process has rendered itself irrelevant. Congress retains power to undo agency regulation, but does so rarely. (Word limitations prohibit discussion here of the Federal Reserve.)

Congress can also be weakened by acquiescing to a president’s executive orders. The Constitution gives Congress, not the president, power to declare war. Congress is also given power “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization” and to the Senate is given power to approve or disapprove of treaties.

But what happens when the President embarks a kinetic action -- resembling war -- in Libya, or when the president refuses to faithfully execute the uniform rule of  naturalization (the immigration laws)  passed by the Congress, or makes executive agreements with foreign nations, in the nature of treaties, which the president refuses to submit to Congress for its advice and consent?

When the Congress acquiesces, it accedes to the diminution of its powers.

Finally, there is a third factor: feckless leadership. There was a time when House and Senate  leaders were willing take on a president who dared to encroach on the powers and coequal status of Congress.

In England, during the reign of the Stuart kings, members of the House of Commons went to the Tower of London to preserve the House’s “power of the purse.”

When the Commons refused to vote subsidies demanded by Charles I to finance his domestic policies and foreign adventures, and when the King embarked upon the device of forced loans to circumvent Parliament’s control over the purse, peers and commoners alike chose prison rather than acquiescence.

In our country, members of our colonial assemblies went to war to defend the principle of “no taxation without representation.”

The present Speaker John Boehner and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, appear to be two men content with their reelection to high office, and otherwise spineless and clueless. Opposed by a president who says “What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is negotiable,” they say, “let’s negotiate, and see what of ours we can give you.”

To loosely paraphrase Winston Churchill, the President demands 75,000 new IRS agents to run Obamacare, Boehner and McConnell, promising to repeal Obamacare, demand negotiations, and then agree to provide and pay for every IRS agent demanded.

Speaker Boehner rather than saying, “This House controls the purse, Mr. President; we oppose Obamacare and were not going to appropriate funds for a single new IRS agent,” says, “We’re afraid we’ll be blamed for a government shutdown; you demand, Mr. President; we’ll deliver!”

When the Congress acts like a rubber stamp, who can blame the president for treating it like one.

Posted Online:  Mar. 17, 2015 11:00 pm - Quad-Cities Online

by John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

Barack H. Obama Clearly No Franklin D. Roosevelt

On Feb. 11,  President Obama asked Congress to pass a Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State (IS). In his letter to Congress, he wrote:

“My Administration’s draft AUMF would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. ...“Local forces, rather than U.S. military forces, should be deployed to conduct such operations....

“The authorization I propose would provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or the use of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership....

“It would also authorize the use of U.S. forces in situations where ground combat operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces.”

Section 3 of his proposed AUMF provides “This authorization for the use of military force shall terminate  three years after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.”

Compare Mr. Obama’s remarks with those of Franklin D. Roosevelt on Dec. 8, 1941, the day after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor -- when FDR asked Congress for a Declaration of War in these unequivocal words:

“Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 -- a date which will live in infamy -- the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. ...

“As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. ...

“No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. ...

“With confidence in our armed forces -- with the unbounding determination of our people -- we will GAIN THE INEVITABLE TRIUMPH -- so help us God.

“I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, Dec. 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.”

President Obama’s Feb. 11 remarks are consistent with his Sept. 10, 2014 remarks, when he spoke of “degrading,” “destroying” and “managing” the “IS” threat.

Why didn’t Mr. Obama use FDR’s speech as a template?  And say:

“Over recent weeks a group of Muslim barbarians calling themselves; ‘The Islamic State’; have shamelessly and savagely beheaded Americans, Christians and anybody else, including other Muslims, they get their blood-stained hands on, who don’t share their despicable, perverted understanding of the Islamic faith. In addition, they have open and publicly declared their intent to kill Americans and fight jihad against  America and its people.

“All measures be taken for our defense ...

“No matter how long it may take ...  win through to absolute victory ...

“... we will gain the inevitable triumph -- so help us God.

“I ask that the Congress declare that since the 9/11 attacks on our country, that a state of war has existed between the United States and all Islamic terrorist, by whatever name they currently style themselves.”

That would have clearly signaled to our people, our allies and our enemies exactly what our president and the American people intend to do in response to Islamic terrorism.

Instead of recognizing these groups already have declared war, and are at war with us, and unequivocally vowing “absolute victory,” the president sends Marie Harf, the State Department “ditz,” out with an inane message that we need to find “jobs” for suicide bombers!

In war, there is no place for political correctness, euphemism or mixed-messages. The American people, our allies, and our enemies must understand why. If our president’s goal is to “degrade,” “manage” or “shrink the Islamic State’s sphere of influence,” that is limited war.

Destroying the Islamic State, on the other hand,  is total war. That is what FDR vowed to do to Japan. We destroyed them to the point of absolute victory. They were unable and unwilling to fight further. FDR knew the job of the Japanese army was to kill Americans; “Jobs for Japanese” was not part of his war plan.

Mr. Obama says, “Local forces, rather than U.S. military forces, should be deployed to conduct [ground] operations.”

But if Americans won’t do what is necessary to protect America from Islamist terrorism, why would local forces sign up to serve as canon fodder?

I can understand the president’s reluctance to fight another ground war. Sadly, he has no easy choices. Most military experts say the war can’t be won by the use of air power alone. How do you eliminate terrorists hiding among the civilian population with air strikes alone?

The real question is, can America win a war, if America fights a civilized war to mange IS,  while IS fights war rejecting all international norms and conventions?

Can we successfully fight a war to manage “IS,” while they fight a war to destroy us? If we do, do we afford them an extended opportunity to strike us catastrophically? Can we afford to sit by while IS becomes a full-fledged terrorist nation-state, financed by oil revenues and the power of taxation?

Dithering only enables IS.n   The more money IS has, the more difficult our winning becomes.

FDR did not speak in terms of degrading or managing  Japan; he spoke of winning an “absolute victory.” FDR didn’t tell our friends and enemies that our war effort would not include “long-term, large-scale ground combat operations;” instead, he spoke of using “all measures.”

FDR didn’t impose a three-year time limit; he spoke of winning -- “inevitable triumph” --  “no matter how long it may take!”


Posted: Wednesday, March 4, 2015 12:10 am
By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015
John Donald O'Shea

Should the U.S. Attempt to Limit Entry by Radicalized Muslims?

On Saturday, Jan. 31, The Dispatch ran an Associated Press piece, headlined, “French fracture laid bare as 8-year-old boy praises terrorists:”

“In early January ... three Frenchmen with links to Islamic extremists went on their murderous rampage, killing journalists at the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. ...

“More French (residents) have embarked on jihad in Syria and Iraq that in any other European country -- over 10,000. Dozens of these fighters have returned, feeding fears that they could turn their battle skills on France.

“The minute of silence for victims (of the Charlie Hebdo massacre) ... was not respected by all students. Some children contested it; others walked out. ... An 8-year-old Muslim boy proclaimed, “I am with the terrorists.”

If radicalized Muslim immigrants are siding with the terrorists and against France, a Western democracy that admitted them to afford them a better life, why is there any reason to believe that at least some radicalized Muslim immigrants to the U.S. won’t side with the terrorists?

Rephrasing the questions, how many radicalized Muslim terrorists should be allowed to reside in the United States? How many radicalized Muslim suicide bombers? How many Islamists who believe the country should be governed by Sharia Law, rather than our Constitution, should we admit annually (and how would you determine whether a particular immigrant poses such a threat)?

According to a Pew Report, since 2006 about 100,000 Muslims enter the U.S. each year.

Wikipedia notes, “A 2013 Pew Research Center poll asked Muslims around the world whether attacks on civilians were justified. Globally 72 percent of Muslims said violence against civilians is never justified, and in the US, 81 percent of Muslims opposed such violence. About 14 percent of Muslims in the nations surveyed (and 8 percent of Muslims in the U.S.) said violence against civilians is ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ justified.”

It is estimated that there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. Fourteen percent of 1.6 billion means there could be 224 million Muslims in the world who believe “violence against civilians is ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ justified.”

But if 100,000 Muslims are entering the U.S. each year, and if 8 percent of those believe “violence against civilians is ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ justified,” how, short of barring entry to all Muslims, do we keep that 8 percent out? And how do we insure that their children will not be radicalized as were  Boston Marathon suspects, the Tsarnaev brothers and the 8-year-old French boy?

The 2013 Pew Report indicates that throughout the Muslim world, terror and the murder of innocent civilians is deemed “justifiable” to 224 million Muslims. Consider three stories that have appeared in The Dispatch over the last few weeks:

Two French Muslims killed 13 French journalists employed at Charlie Hebdo. Why? That satirical magazine published an unflattering cartoon about Muhammad. A third Muslim, one of their associates, killed four civilians in a Jewish grocery store. Why a Jewish store?

According to Amnesty International, as many as 2,000 women, children and elderly people were murdered  in the Nigerian town of Baga by the militant Muslim Boko Haram militia.

On Dec. 16, 2014, Taliban gunmen attacked a military-run school and killed 141 people -- almost all of them students,  innocent children. The murders were so barbaric even Taliban militants in neighboring Afghanistan decried the killing spree, calling it “un-Islamic.”

I don’t mean to imply or suggest that all Muslims who enter our country are terrorists, suicide bombers, or Sharia Law proponents. They aren’t. But the 9/11 terrorist murders, and the Boston Marathon murders conclusively demonstrate that at least 21 Muslim “immigrants” were terrorist murderers.

And while the great majority of Muslims coming to America are peaceful, decent people looking for a better life, how many al-Qaida, Taliban or ISIS adherents are slipping in among them?

So, I refer to the questions I asked in the opening paragraph.

If one in 100 Muslims admitted into the U.S. is a terrorist or a suicide bomber, or a Sharia Law proponent, is it in the best interest of the American people to admit that 100?

If only one in a 1,000 turns out to be a suicide bomber is that risk worthwhile? How about if one in 10,000? One in 100,000?

I raise these politically incorrect questions because Reuters reported last May 22nd,  “The Justice Department has tapped a veteran prosecutor to probe the flow of foreign fighters, including Americans, who are joining Syria’s rebels. Our government is concerned with the danger of these radicalized militants returning home.” (reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/us-usa-syria-foreigners-idUSBREA4L0UC20140522)

The fear is that when they are done fighting in Syria, they will return to the U.S. to kill here -- just as many have done in France. If this government and this Justice Department have concerns, every American should have like concerns. And while the president is “ending” America’s war on radical Muslim terrorists,  I see no evidence to date terrorists are ending their war against America -- or anybody else who disagrees with them.

So at least two questions remain.

-- How does America keep Islamic terrorists from slipping in while admitting peaceful Muslims immigrants? And

-- If 8 percent of Muslims immigrants admitted to America, and/or 8 percent  of the children of peaceful Muslims admitted to America are going to take up the cause of radical Islam or demand Sharia Law for America, is it wise to admit even their peaceful parents?


Posted: Saturday, February 21, 2015 12:00 am
By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015
John Donald O'Shea
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