Beware of who is Defining what Constitutes "Social Justice."

A word or a phrase can have two or more very distinct meanings, depending on who uses the word. Take for example, “social justice.”

For the Catholic Church, “Social justice is linked to the common good,” BUT “can only be obtained only in respecting the transcendent dignity of man.

“Society ensures social justice when it provides the conditions that allow associations or individuals to obtain what is their due, according to their nature and their vocation.

For the church, “The person represents the ultimate end of society, which is ordered to him.”

The church argues that “Respect for the human person proceeds by way of respect for the principle that “everyone should look upon his neighbor (without any exception) as ‘another self,’ above all bearing in mind his life and the means necessary for living it with dignity.”

The church explains its social justice teachings, saying, “Created in the image of the one God and equally endowed with rational souls, all men have the same nature and the same origin.” But the church notes, “On coming into the world, man is not equipped with everything he needs for developing his bodily and spiritual life. He needs others. Differences appear tied to age, physical abilities, intellectual or moral aptitudes, the benefits derived from social commerce, and the distribution of wealth. The ‘talents’ are not distributed equally. These differences belong to God’s plan.”

The church also teaches that it is part of God’s plan that “These differences encourage and often oblige persons to practice generosity, kindness, and sharing of goods. Indeed, Christ taught in the Sermon on the Mount that each in need should ‘receive what he needs from others’. And that those endowed with particular ‘talents’ share the benefits with those who need them.“

The Church sums up each social justice teaching, saying, “The equal dignity of human persons requires the effort to reduce excessive social and economic inequalities. It gives urgency to the elimination of sinful inequalities.”

The disciples of Saul Alinsky also speak in terms of social justice. His dream expressed in the following paragraph, would no doubt receive the approbation of the Christian churches:

“To realize the democratic dream of equality, justice, peace, cooperation, equal and full opportunities for education, full and useful employment, health, and the creation of those circumstances in which man can have the chance to live by values that give meaning to life.”

But for Alinsky and his followers, social justice is not an extension of Christian charity.

It is rather something to be seized during the course of revolution by whatever means are feasible.

The Church, in its catechism,  would encourage those with more to share. Alinsky’s “Rules for Radicals,” (his “bible”) by way of contrast, instructs the Have-Nots on “how to take it away.” His method has little to do with Christian charity.”

“In this book we are concerned with how to create mass organizations to seize power and give it to the people. ... This means revolution.”

The Church’s teachings on social justice must be read in conjunction with, and tempered with, its teachings on “ends” and “means.” The Church teaches “The morality of human acts depends on the object chosen;  the end in view or the intention; and the circumstances of the action. “For example, assume your object is to help your neighbor who is in need. That is a good object. But the church would say that that alone, is not sufficient to define the morality of your act.

“A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).”

Alinsky concerns himself only with means and ends.

He does not recognize the concept of “objective good.” For him, truth is “relative and changing.” Nor would he acknowledge an “objective good.”

“We live in a world where ‘good’ is a value dependent on whether we want it. ... The Haves want to keep; the Have-Nots want to get.”

Therefore, for Alinsky, “Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The ‘end’ is what you want, and the ‘means’ is how you get it. ... The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work.”

So, for the Christian, the ultimate objective good is God. But not for Alinsky.

“We live in a world where ‘good’ is a value dependent on whether we want it. ... The Haves want to keep; the Have-Nots want to get.”

So, where do you feel safe? In a world living according to the Church’s teachings? Or in a world of Alinskys? Both speak of social justice. But the Church’s world is incompatible with that of Hitler and Stalin. The Church affirms the dignity of every human person. It is otherwise in Alinsky’s.

“One does not always enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of mankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual’s personal salvation. He who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience ... doesn’t care enough for people to be ‘corrupted’ for them.”

What Hitler and Stalin did, they did to promote the general welfare of their respective states. The Islamic State purports to do likewise.

My point is: When you pick your social justice companions, be careful with whom you choose to travel. Many who traveled with Hitler and Stalin, were marched to their death camps and gulags.

Posted: Friday, May 22, 2015 11:00 pm - QuadCities Online.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

Don't Make Geller Villain in Texas Attack

“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and -- as it did here -- inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course -- to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” 
                                                            -- Chief Justice John Roberts, Snyder v. Phelps (2011)

In the wake of the intended slaughter at the Draw Muhammad Event in Garland, Texas, two very different pictures are being drawn of Pamela Geller who heads the promoting organization called  "American Freedom Defense Initiative."

It was Geller and others involved that Simpson and Soofi intended to attack with assault rifle, before they were shot dead.

Brian Levin, J.D. writes on the Huffington Post, "Pamela Geller, 56, a self-described free-speech advocate and outspoken Islamophobe who spins wild, hateful conspiracy theories about Muslims ..."

To Sean Hannity, she is a defender of free speech, and an implacable opponent of Muslim Jihad. 

Until the attempted jihad in Texas, I had never heard of Pamela Geller or "AFDI." Here is what "AFDI" says about itself in its mission statement:

              "Our objective is to go on the offensive when legal, academic, legislative,
               cultural, sociological, and political actions are taken to dismantle our basic
               freedoms and values.

              "AFDI acts against the treason being committed by national, state, and local
              government officials, the mainstream media, and others in their capitulation
              to the global jihad and Islamic supremacism, the ever-encroaching and
              unconstitutional power of the federal government, and the rapidly moving
              attempts to impose socialism and Marxism upon the American people.”

The  partial transcripts below, clearly indicates Ms. Geller unabashedly speaks her mind, and minces no words." So the question is, is she a "a Muslim-hater," a self-aggrandizer and a bigot, or an American who has made up her mind to defend freedom of speech by saying whatever the radical Muslims say she can't say without subjecting herself to capital punishment under Sharia law?  Should she capitulate; and engage in political correctness? Many say, yes.

On May 3, Geller was interviewed by CNN anchor, Alisyn Camerota:

Camerota: Did you get any intel from the police just how dangerous an event like this could be?

Geller: It's dangerous because increasingly we're abridging our freedoms so as not to offend savages. The very idea that if something offends me, or if I'm insulted by something, I'll kill you, and that way, I can get my way, and somehow this is OK with members of the elite media and academia,  is outrageous.

Camerota: Of course everyone's concerned about the violences, but let's face it, your event was not just about the violence ...

Geller: My event was about freedom of speech, period. Freedom of Speech is  the First Amendment. ... Political speech is the most protected, because who will decide what is good and what is forbidden? These arbitrary voices? ... The Muslim Brotherhood? We need to have this conversation. The fact that we have to spend upwards of $50,000 in security speaks to how dangerous and how in trouble freedom of speech is in this country. And then we have to get on these news shows, and somehow those that are targeted, those who were going to be slaughtered, are attacked, speaks to how morally inverted this conversation is. I'm not concerned with Muslims, especially peaceful Muslims, but I am concerned with the 25 percent who support Sharia.

Later, on May 5, Geller again appeared -- this time opposite a radical Muslim cleric from London, Anjem Choudry.

Sean Hannity: You want world-wide Sharia?....

Choundry: Of course. We believe the whole world to be governed by Sharia law.

Hannity: And you believe Muslims who leave their religion  -- apostates-- should be killed.

Choudry: Well, of course. The prophet said whoever changes, kill him.

Hannity: And gays and lesbians should be killed.

Choudry: If they do the acts publicly, it carries capital punishment. ...

Hannity: All these incidents over a cartoon .... Do you support this death threat against Pam Geller because she ran a free speech contest drawing cartoons of your prophet?...

Choudry: You're talking about people who deliberately had a competition to insult the message of Muhammad. ... Now this woman was to draw cartoons or have people draw cartoons to insult the prophet knowing full well this carries the death penalty in Islam. ...

Hannity: So you support the death penalty for Pam Geller, who is not Muslim, because she had a cartoon contest? ...

Choudry: ... It's about divine law. Whoever insults the Messenger ... that would carry capital punishment.

Hannity:So you want her to die?

Choudry: She should be put before a Sharia court, and tried and, if she's found guilty, of course it would carry capital punishment.

There is no question that Geller was provocative. She meant to be provocative. A main argument made against her is that she may well have had the right of free speech, but that she was a self-aggrandizer and bigot for exercising it.

But if there is to be free speech in America, people have to be free to say what they think. Geller may be right or wrong. You can form your own rough opinions.

Our First Amendment  says, Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, or the press. Our 14th Amendment, extends both rights against abridgment by any state. So if Congress and the states cannot abridge free speech and press, are we going to say Muslim clerics with their 7th century mentalities can? Is there a better way to fight "fuquas" barring free speech than to say exactly what the Muslim bigots and fanatics say you can't say?  Say nothing, and they win.

But what I find utterly insane is at the same time radical Muslims would criminalize Geller's right to free speech, they themselves are exercising their right to free speech in calling for her assassination. And in the view of some Americans, Geller has suddenly becomes the "villain."

Two assassins traveled 1,000 miles to kill her, and deny her her constitutional rights to life, liberty and free speech, and she is portrayed as the villain! If Geller is against global jihad, given the beheadings of Christians, and the kidnappings, rapes and forced-marriages of young girls being perpetrated by people calling themselves "Muslims" in the name of Islam, maybe she has good reason. And don't forget: they already tried to exterminate her, and have issued a new "fuqua," calling her a "swine," and promising to kill her -- as well as anyone who gives her a platform.

Posted: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 11:00 pm-  QuadCitiesOnline

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

If Everyone Lies, Why Negotiate Anything?

 “Never attempt to win by force what can be won by deception. ... The promise given was a necessity of the past: the word broken is a necessity of the present.-- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince


For the last six years, our president and his administration have operated on the principle of that the ends justify the means. The "end" is always said to be the welfare of the American people. The "means" have included making promises with no intent to keep them, or knowing they will be broken when convenient. For just one example, watch Professor Jonathan Gruber: youtube.com/watch?v=Adrdmmh7bMo

But what happens in the area of foreign negotiations when enemies such as Russia, Iran or the Islamic State employ the same tactic? What if during the course of negotiations, they make promises with no intent to keep them, or with intent to renege as soon as it suits their convenience? What if the Russians lie to us about what the are doing in Ukraine? What if the Iranians lie to us about their uranium enrichment sites?

Both Russia and Iran have "ends" in mind. If the ends justify the means in Washington, why not in Moscow or Teheran? And if your opponent signs an agreement with no intent to observe it, or with intent to disregard it when convenient, what is the value of the written and signed agreement?
You can say, "How can you be sure they will lie or make promises they don't intent to keep?" In truth, I can't be sure. But deceit for them is small change compared to the other more lethal acts they have undertaken to achieve their ends.

Putin, for example, shamelessly invaded and occupies portions of Georgia, seizes Crimea, and makes war on the Ukraine, using Russian arms, Russian special forces and Ukrainian proxies -- all in flagrant violation of International Law.

Iran, while claiming peaceful intentions, sends arms to Hezzbollah, Hamas and the Houthi in Yemen, after supplying IEDs that killed and maimed American troops for more than a decade, while moving on a daily basis to acquire ICBMs and a nuclear bomb.

If I am willing to kill you to achieve my end, will I scruple at intentionally deceiving you to achieve that same end at a lower cost?

In his book, "Rules for Radicals," Saul Alinsky devotes his second chapter to a discussion of means and ends.

“The second rule of the ethics of 'means and ends' is that the judgment of  the ethics of 'means' is dependent upon the political position of those sitting in judgment. If you actively opposed the Nazi occupation and joined the underground Resistance, then you adopted the means of assassination, terror, property destruction, the bombing of tunnels and trains, kidnapping, and the willingness to sacrifice innocent hostages to the end of defeating the Nazis. Those who opposed the Nazi conquerors regarded the Resistance as a secret army of selfless, patriotic idealists, courageous beyond expectation and willing to sacrifice their lives to their moral convictions.To the occupation authorities, however, these people were lawless terrorists, murderers, saboteurs, assassins, who believed that the end justified the means, and were utterly unethical according to the mystical rules of war. ... However, in such conflict, neither protagonist is concerned with any value except victory. It is life or death.

“Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The 'end' is what you want, and the 'means' is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only    whether they will work."

Of course Alinsky was not the first to argue the ends justify the means. Around 1513, Machiavelli wrote "The Prince"  in which states:

"Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless … those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and ... in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word.

"If men were entirely good, this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance.

"It is necessary [for the prince] to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived.

"Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them ...  -- to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright ...
"A prince ... cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed,  being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,  friendship, humanity, and religion.”

So, is it possible to negotiate with the likes of Putin and Iran's Ali Khamenei? Yes. Neville Chamberlain was even able to get Adolf Hitler to put his signature to a  written agreement? Hitler then tore up the agreement when convenient.

Without foolproof verification only a blithering idiot would believe Khamenei and the Iranian regime after they've promised the annihilation of Israel and developed ICBMs -- while claiming their centrifuges are only for "peaceful purposes.

Posted Online:  May 8, 2015 at 11:10 pm - Quad-Cities Online

by John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

Religious 'Free Exercise" vs. Discrimination

What happens when one person’s First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, free speech or freedom of association run head-on into a second person’s First Amendment rights? Or when one person’s free exercise of religion results in discrimination against that second?

That is what the furor is over Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The gay community fears that a business owner, operating a “place of public accommodations,” could as part of his right to freely exercise his religion, discriminate against a gay couple by refusing to cater the gay couple’s wedding. As such, the gay community and others have objected to the Indiana RFRA.

In enacting the federal RFRA, Congress recognized that laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.

It provided that “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the substantial burden to the person -- is in furtherance of a ‘compelling governmental interest;’ and is the ‘least restrictive means’ of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

State RFRAs track federal law.

Unquestionably, the concern with discrimination is real. But protestors have selected the wrong target. The bottom line  is this: When the government legislates “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” (e.g., to outlaw “invidious discrimination”), if that legislation substantially burdens the free exercise of a person’s religion, the government must choose the “least restrictive means” of achieving its interest. But least restrictive, at least to me, presupposes an alternative. What if there is no “alternative”? In such a case, it seems the RFRA provides no guidance.

Assume, hypothetically, that the owner of a pizzaria in Nowheresville, Ind., believes gay marriage is sinful, and that in catering a gay wedding he would make himself complicit in sin. Can he be compelled to do so? If not, isn’t he discriminating against the couple? Is there a middle ground?

The U.S. Supreme Court case of Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian ... of Boston (1995) -- a rare unanimous Supreme Court opinion — probably provides the best answer that can be found.

In Hurley, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council organized and conducted the annual St. Patrick’s Day Parade. In 1992 a number of gay, lesbian and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants formed GLIB to march in the parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals. The council refused to admit GLIB. It sued and prevailed in all Massachusetts state courts.

“GLIB did not claim the council’s action amounted to ‘state action’ that denied them ‘equal protection of the laws’ in violation of the 14th Amendment.”

In that regard, the Supreme Court noted, “the guarantees of free speech and equal protection guard only against encroachment by the government” and “erect no shield against merely private conduct.”

The court then explained how 1st Amendment rights of the participants are implicated by a parade.

“Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches.

“Our cases have recognized that the First Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so) ... wearing an arm band to protest a war ... displaying a red flag ...  and even ‘marching, walking or parading’ in uniforms displaying the swastika.”

The court then acknowledged the state’s competing interest in preventing discrimination.

“The Massachusetts public accommodations law under which respondents brought suit has a venerable history.

“At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who ‘made profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.

“... the rule was that ‘the innkeeper is not to select his guests; he has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants.”

The court then noted the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute “does not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content, the focal point of its prohibition being rather on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods ...  and services on the proscribed grounds.”

Nevertheless, the court held that the Council’s collective 1st Amendment rights prevailed over GLIB’s  similar 1st Amendment collective rights, and its right not to be discriminated against.

“All speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid. ... One important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’

“The Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.

“The message it disfavored (GLIB’s) is not difficult to identify.”

The Court then noted:

“On its face, the object of the (anti-discrimination) law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public accommodations what the old common law promised to any member of the public wanting a meal at the inn, that accepting the usual terms of service, they will not be turned away merely on the proprietor’s exercise of personal preference.

“(But) When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own.”

As such, the question seems to be whether the celebration of the gay marriage in my hypothetical  amounts to “expressive activity.” If the ceremony amounts to “expressive activity” or “advocacy of a cause,” the pizzaria owner probably can, as a matter of freedom of religion, speech and association, decline to associate himself with the ceremony -- just as he could decline to march in a gay rights parade. But if the marriage amounts simply to a private exchange of vows, rather than “expressive activity” in support of a cause, the gay couple may well prevail.

Posted Online:  April 24, 2015 11:40 pm - Quad-Cities Online

by John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

It's Not America's Religious Freedom Laws Which Have Changed

To understand the intent of Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ("RFRA") it is useful to view it side-by-side with earlier federal and Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.

The RFRA was passed by Congress in 1993 to protect the free exercise of religion in America. Here are the Congressional findings as to the need for the law:

1. The Famers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;

2. Laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;

3. Governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;

4. In Employment Division v. Smith, (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and

5. The compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.


Congress then stated its purposes in passing the act:

1. To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert  and Yoder, and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and

2. To provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.


Congress, then provided

a. In general: Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection(b) of this section.

b. Exception: Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -- 1. is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2. is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

c. Judicial relief: A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.


In 1998, Illinois passed the  Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Illinois Legislature stated its purposes:

1. To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Yoder, and Sherbert, and to guarantee that a test of compelling governmental interest will be imposed on all State and local ... laws ...  and governmental actions ... in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.

2. To provide a claim or defense to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by government.

The Illinois Legislature virtually copied the Federal Act.

“Free exercise of religion protected. Government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Then, to guarantee compliance with the act, the Legislature again copied the federal act, but added a provision for attorney’s fees to allow a person whose “free exercise” was trampled by the state to hire an attorney to vindicate his rights.


So what did the original Indiana Act say that has caused all the furor? How is the Indiana Act different from the federal act and/or the Illinois act?

Here’s what the Indiana Law provided:

“Sec. 8. a. Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

“Sec. 9. A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened ...  by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation ... as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding.”
A following section allowed the victim of an undue state burden to sue for declaratory relief, injunction, compensatory damages and/or attorneys fees.

The federal and Illinois statues were passed to protect the citizen and other persons  in the “free exercise of their religion” as guaranteed by the First Amendment against the enforcement of “neutral laws” that “substantially burden” the “free exercise of religion” unless there was a “compelling state interest” involved, and unless the “least restrictive means” of furthering that compelling governmental interest were employed.

When the federal and Illinois laws were passed, there was no uproar. Nobody for a minute thought that the purpose of the laws was to allow people to discriminate against anybody.

The purpose of the Indiana law was the same. But times have changed. Now a law passed for the express purpose of keeping government from unnecessarily burdening the “free exercise of religion” is viewed as allowing discrimination against certain individuals rather than as protecting religious freedom.

In my next op-ed I will explore the worrisome danger of “religious freedom” degenerating into “invidious discrimination.”

Posted: Saturday, April 18, 2015 11:00 pm, QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea 

Religion: Congress vs. the US Supreme Court

Indiana and Arkansas recently have passed Religious Freedom Laws. There has been a fierce negative reaction. This piece is not about those laws. Rather, it discusses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) passed by Congress in 1993, in one of its most lucid moments, rejecting the Oregon v. Smith holding of the U.S. Supreme Court. 

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof  ...”  

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a person has an “absolute right” under the “establishment clause” to hold whatever religious beliefs he desires. But the “free exercise” of religion is not unlimited.  For example, you have an absolute right to believe that  “cannibalism ” is the “true religion.”  “Free exercise” of your religion does not allow you to boil and eat your neighbor’s children.

The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the RFRA, and a subsequent piece of Congressional Legislation, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) extensively in its 2014 Hobby Lobby decision.

“Congress enacted RFRA ... in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.   RFRA’s enactment came three years after this Court’s decision in ... Oregon v. Smith, ... which largely repudiated the method of analyzing free-exercise claims that had been used in cases like Sherbert and Yoder ... ”

The court then explained why Congress got involved.

“In determining whether challenged government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, (Sherbert and Yoder) used a balancing test that took into account whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government interest.”

Sherbert involved an employee who had been fired for refusing to work on her sabbath. The court held that she could not be denied unemployment benefits… In Yoder, the court held that Amish children could not be required to comply with a state law demanding that they remain in school until the age of 16. Recognition had to be given to the fact that their religion required them to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their formative adolescent years.”

But then In Oregon v. Smith, the court rejected “the balancing test set forth in Sherbert.” Smith concerned two members of the Native American Church who were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. When they sought unemployment benefits, the State of Oregon rejected their claims on the ground that consumption of peyote was a crime, but the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, held that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.

The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, and rejected its own “Sherbert balancing test,” holding “the Sherbert test -- whenever a person objected on religious grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable law -- “would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”

The Smith court then set out a new test. “Under the First Amendment, “neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”

Congress appalled, responded to Smith by enacting RFRA. It first found:

“Laws that are 'neutral' toward religion,” ... “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”

Then to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, Congress legislated that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” ... If the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person --  (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Then, not satisfied with later Supreme Court decisions, Congress again intervened, passing the RLUIPA to insure that an “expansive” rather than a “restrictive” definition was given to the term “free exercise of religion.”

“In RLUIPA -- in an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law -- Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”… 

 Indeed, Congress mandated that “free exercise”  “be construed in favor of a broad protection of  religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”

So, why am I writing about the two federal laws when the furor is about Indiana and Arkansas laws? In a future piece I propose to compare/contrast the new state laws with RFRA.

Posted: Saturday, April 9, 2015, 11:00  pm - QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

'Sales Tax Increase Won't Give Schools 'the Best'

• Story
• Comments 

Print

Create a hardcopy of this page

Font Size:

Default font size

Larger font sizeI 

"I think they had already decided what they were going to do before they had their public meetings.” --  Michelle Anderson (lives on 7th Street, opposite Hamilton School, after a Moline School Board meeting)

                          

A year ago, a special interest group calling itself YES Makes Cents for Students, and the Moline District 40 School Board, lobbied the public to pass a 1 percent sales tax referendum that would have dumped $11.5 million into the districts' coffers, with the sales-pitch “our kids deserve the best.”

In March 2014, 55.78 percent of the voters flatly refused to impose the 1 percent sales tax. A similar referendum had failed in 2009.

Refusing to take "no" for an answers, YES Makes Cents for Students, and the county school board have once again forced the issue onto this year’s April 7 ballot:

“Shall a retailers’ occupation tax and service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a 'sales tax') be imposed in The County of Rock Island, Illinois, at the rate of 1 percent to be used exclusively for school facility purposes?”

The hope is, this being a municipal election -- with a lower turnout expected --  the "no" voters will stay home, and the “yes” people -- the tax increase supporters -- will make a point of getting to the polls.

So why does Moline need a 1 percent sales tax increase for “school facility purposes?”

Could it have anything to do with the fact that it is spending -- without first seeking voter approval via referendum  -- $17.3 million to “renovate” Hamilton school, cramming the project down the throats of the objecting neighbors?

Moline District 40 just sold Ericsson School for $50,000, and Garfield School for $75,000! Ericsson was a 22,912-square-foot facility built in 1969. It was sold for $2.18 per square foot. At the same time, the “renovated” Hamilton “super school” will be a 69,000 square foot. facility with a of cost $250 per square foot. The net loss is two school buildings and $17.15 million!

Superintendent David Moyer earlier told the voters that the $17.3 million cost of “the project will not affect the current tax rate. Once Ericsson and Garfield elementary schools close and their students start at Hamilton Elementary, the district will save a minimum of $350,000 annually.”

It appears, however, that he failed to mention that the $17.3 million expansion would create a  “need” for the district to try and ram through a 1 percent perpetual sales tax increase -- i.e., a tax increase each and every year! And if we do indeed save the promised $350,000 per year, it will only take 50 years for the voters to break even and  to get back the $17.3 million spent.

So what will the taxpayers get for their $17.3 million? Here’s Mr. Moyer’s description:

The Hamilton "project includes a new entrance and front office area with updated security; a two-story, horseshoe-shaped addition connected to the existing building; a circular, two-story addition with an open space school officials are calling the 'Imaginarium;' a new commons/lunchroom area; a music classroom that can be opened and used as a stage; a gymnasium; a new playground; and a new driveway and parking lot.

Here are some pertinent facts: Moline District 40 enrollment was 7,493 in the 2013-2014 school year. Total governmental fund revenues for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014 were $87,676,046.  Total governmental funds revenues increased $1,769,135 or 2 percent from the previous year. Total governmental funds expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014 were  $99,118,747.

The district states “its operating expenditures per pupil were $9,853.97.” But if the total  funds expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 were $99,118,747, as there were 7,493 students, the “governmental fund expenditure” was $13,228 per student.

Compare those facts with facts contained in the Alleman High School 2013-14 Annual Report.

Total Operating Fund Revenues: $2,991,284

Total Operating Fund Expenses: $2,981,910

Alleman 2013-2014 enrollment: 464 students

Alleman is therefore spending $6,727 per student, while Moline District 40 is spending either $9,853 or $13,228 per student.

The student to teacher ratio at Alleman is 17:1. The average class size at Moline is 25.

Students meeting or exceeding ACT Readiness Benchmark Report:

-- Alleman: 66 percent

-- State of Illinois: 44 percent

-- United Township High School: 28 percent

-- Rock Island high School: 23 percent

-- Moline: 48 percent

Average 2014 ACT Scores:

-- Alleman: 23.6

-- Illinois Quad-Cities: 18.8

Percentage of students who will attend college/universities:

Alleman: 98 percent

Moline: 63 percent

Maybe instead of pushing tax increases, which hurt every taxpayer and business in Rock Island County, perhaps its time to take note of what Alleman is doing, and how it is doing it. Maybe if your “kids really do deserve the best,” perhaps its time to send them to Alleman.

(The 2013-14 Moline Budget appears at: molineschools.org/budget/14_15/CAFR%20Moline%20School%20District%2014%20Final.pdf. The Alleman 2013-14 Annual Report appears at: allemanhighschool.org/editoruploads/files/1314%20annual%20report.pdf)

Posted: Saturday, March 20, 2015 am - QCOnline.com

By John Donald O'Shea

Copyright 2015

John Donald O'Shea

Posted: Friday, March 20, 2015 11:00 pm By John Donald O'Shea