Is it time to amend First and Second Amendments?

When the first Congress added the Bill of Rights to our U.S. Constitution, freedom of speech, freedom of worship and the right to bear arms were put at the top of the list of protected rights.

The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech … .”

The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”

So, is it time to “update” these amendments? To amend them to bring them into conformity with the more enlightened current notions of perhaps half of the American people.

Should the First Amendment perhaps be revised to provide, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; Provided, however, that no religious denomination shall make or enforce any ecclesiastical rule or law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any religious denomination deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws of the United States. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article?


Should the revised First Amendment further specify, “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, unless that speech has first been determined to be ‘disinformation,’ by the president’s office of disinformation. Congress hereby authorizes the president to establish a presidential office of disinformation, and to appoint the officers thereof. That office shall have the sole power of determining what speech amounts to “disinformation,” and to prohibit dissemination thereof whenever that office determines that dissemination of that “disinformation” creates a likelihood of danger to the government or people. Disinformation shall be punishable by imprisonment from one to five years, and a fine up to $5 million.


Should the Second Amendment be amended to provide, “The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall be subject to the power of Congress to establish any and all limitations on that right as Congress shall adjudge reasonable?



Would we be better off with these simple amendments to our Bill of Rights? Should the Bill of Rights be subject revision by the majority vote of both Houses of Congress, when approved by the president? Whenever a majority of the American people hold a referendum to amend the First and/or Second Amendment?

Or should the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights be above the will of any Congressional simple majority? Above the power of a simple majority of the voters to amend?

It has been said that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to put the inalienable rights of the American people above the power of repeal or amendment by a simple majority? Were the men who did that right or wrong?

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on June 25, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

Cure for gang violence is faster trials

Judges, prosecutors and prompt jury trials are the remedy for street gang violence

Prosecuting street gang violence is most often very difficult. The members of the gangs perpetrating the violence most often do whatever they can to avoid testifying honestly for the State’s Attorney prosecuting the case. That includes “taking the 5th Amendment,” disappearing to avoid testifying, telling half-truths, and even engaging in perjury. The members of the rival gang often do the same, preferring to rely on street violence and revenge rather than on the Criminal Justice System.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the only way to break the cycle of gang violence is prompt prosecution. The gang members have to know that it is more dangerous to be caught breaking the law than it is to engage in street gang violence. When a gang member is convicted of murder, the penalty imposed must be near the maximum to make it clear to all gang members that the next killing will merit a similar penalty. The penalty must be sufficient to take the fun out of shooting at opposing gang members on sight.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Article 6 of our Bill of Rights) provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury …”

The Illinois Legislature, except in cases where the defendant is not fit to stand trial and where the defendant causes the delay, to implement that Sixth Amendment right has provided that where a defendant is in custody, he shall be tried by a court having jurisdiction within 120 days. A defendant who is out on bond and who demands a speedy trial has to be brought to trial within 160 days in the absence of an exception.

The speedy trial rule exists because a defendant awaiting trial in custody is serving the equivalent of prison time before he has been found guilty. Without the rule, a defendant taken into custody could sit in jail indefinitely if the prosecutor indefinitely delays bringing his case to trial.

But the speedy trial rule also exists to require cases to be brought to trial within the stated time limits to afford the victims of crime assurance that the law will deal with the alleged perpetrator of a crime as quickly as the needs of the prosecution and defense permit.

Shortly after I was elected a judge in 1974, I was sent to a “New Judges’ Seminar,” conducted by the Hon. Roy O. Gulley, the Illinois Supreme Court’s administrative director of the Illinois Court System.

Among the things Judge Gulley told us were the following:

1. A judge should not sit on the bench like an “alabaster bust of his grandsire.” A judge is not a mere umpire; he is the governor of the trial. It is his non-delegable duty to see that justice is done.

2. Besides having judicial duties, a judge has administrative duties. Justice delayed is justice denied. The judge must control his own docket; he cannot cede management of his docket to the attorneys, the clerks, or anybody else.

3. When you set discovery dates, pre-trial dates, and plea dates for a Criminal case, set for the “ordinary” Criminal Case. The trial date for an “ordinary” criminal case should be set for no more than 60 days after the defendant’s initial appearance in court. Set the “extraordinary” cases on the same 60-day schedule. If continuances are required, they should always be granted to a day certain. (In running the Criminal Division in Rock Island County, my continuances were always for 14 days, but the attorneys were aware that they could always get one or more additional 14-day continuances for “good cause.” In the 8.5 years that I served as the presiding judge of criminal, I cannot recall ever granting a 3rd continuance — even in a murder case.)

4. Continuances should be granted only for something that was not foreseen when the dates were initially set and only for bona fide cause.

Before I was appointed head of the Criminal Division in Rock Island County, the Illinois Legislature provided that defendants who failed to appear for trial on the date set by the court could be tried in their absence if they were admonished at the time the trial date was set of all the constitutional rights they would be forfeiting if they failed to appear for trial.

In an era when the idiots in the legislature have legislated to eliminate cash bail, trying defendants who have been properly admonished and who fail to appear for trial in absentia strongly deters defendants from jumping non-cash bail. Once "old Gang-bang Charlie" is found guilty in absentia and a warrant is issued for his arrest and confinement pending sentencing, the word will get around the street gang community like wildfire. It takes about two minutes to properly admonish “that you will be tried in your absence if you fail to appear for trial.” It saves the sheriff hours of work tracking down the absconding defendant. And it normally results in a quick, easy trial for the court and the attorneys.

When judges are being paid roughly $200,000 per year, it is not unreasonable for the voters to expect the judges to conduct prompt trials. There is no legitimate excuse, barring the defendant’s unfitness, for even murder cases taking a year for “disposition” — i.e., until plea, dismissal or the first day of trial.

Those that say it can’t be done are too lazy to try. Once the judge makes up his mind to move cases, if the prosecutor cooperates, the average time of disposition should be no more than 90 days.

And if our judges or prosecutors need a seminar, I’ll teach them what Judge Gulley taught me.

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on June 18, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

A simple plan to get "big bucks" out of judicial elections

It is long-past time for the Illinois Supreme Court to make a new rule to get “big bucks” out of Illinois Judicial Elections. That rule should be designed to remove the incentive for donors to dump obscene amounts of money into Illinois Judicial elections.

What am I talking about?

Example 1. Lawyer X runs to fill a vacancy on the Illinois Supreme Court. X is a lifelong Democrat. To get Lawyer X on the Supreme Court, The Democratic Governor of Illinois contributes $1 million and the Democratic Speaker of the Illinois House contributes $350,000, to Lawyer X’s “Campaign Committee.” They do so because they believe it is more likely Lawyer X will approve the Congressional reapportionment map drawn by Democrats, than his Republican opponent.

Example 2. Lawyer X wins election and is now Mr. Justice X. After serving his 10-year term, he faces a “Retention Election.” He has no opponent. The ballot simply askes, “Shall Judge X be retained.” Q and Z are two Republican billionaires. Because Q and Z consider Justice X likely to vote for the Democrat’s reapportionment map, which they consider outrageously “gerrymandered,” they create a “Committee for an Honest Judiciary” and fund it to the tune of $7 million. With that $7 million they plan to run newspaper ads labeling Justice X, who has declined to recuse himself from consideration of that reapportionment case, “The best Judge money can buy,” “The governor’s pet judge.” Etc.

The governor and the speaker will be de facto parties-defendant (in their official capacities) in the suit to have the Democrat’s map declared “unconstitutional. The “CHJ” will also funds TV spots, bellowing that “Justice X, who has refused to recuse himself, after having taken $1,350,000 from the two defendants, is guilty of creating a gross appearance of impropriety.” And the “CHJ” will probably go on to accuse Justice X of “corruption” — “No honest judge takes $1.35 million as a campaign donation, and then sits on a case involving the donors.”

Lost in the hyperbole is the concept that the money wasn’t really given to the judge; it was, instead, given to his “campaign committee,” and that committee never told the judge of the S1.35 million. But then, of course, news of the donations makes all the newspapers.

My point is this: If Justice X sits on a case where a party donated $1.35 million, he paints a target on his back, and puts himself in a “no win” situation. Even if his decision is impeccably correct, roughly half the voters in the state will focus only upon the fact that he has taken $1.35 million from a party. This brings not only Justice X into disrepute, but, even worse, it brings the entire Illinois Judiciary into disrepute.

Can limits be put on the amount of money a person, corporation or other entity can contribute to a judicial campaign? Could the Supreme Court write a rule that said, “No judicial campaign committee shall receive a donation from any person, corporation, or other entity exceeding $100?” $500? $1,000? (Note: the sum would have to be small enough that no reasonable person would believe that such a campaign donation would be sufficient to influence any rationale judge.)

But would such severe limits pass constitutional muster? I don’t know. Donations have been equated with free speech in the case law.

I would therefore opt for an alternate “solution.” I would strongly suggest that the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court write the following Rule of Judicial Conduct:

“After his/her election or retention, the judge shall promptly make himself aware of all donations made to his “campaign committee “and keep a list of all those donations on hand. 

 

"The judge shall have a duty to recuse himself/herself in all cases where it appears that donating person, corporation or other entity has donated directly or indirectly more than $500 to the judge’s “campaign committee.”

I suggest the sum of $500 because no Illinois Judge, making an annual salary of $212,058 to $258,456 is going to be bribed for $500.

I am reasoning that if a litigant, who otherwise would donate $1 million or $5 million to a Judge’s “campaign committee,” knows that the judge won’t be able to hear his case, the incentive to donate vast amounts of money to the judge’s “campaign committee” will immediately disappear.

Maybe I am a “Pollyanna.” But I don’t like seeing judges paint targets on their own backs.

I don’t like judges doing anything that is likely to create an appearance of impropriety. The conduct of a single judge can bring an entire judiciary into disrepute — even if it is “ethical” under existing rules.

The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution’s Judicial Article wanted to get money out of judicial elections. It’s time for the Illinois Supreme Court to implement that intent.

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on June 11, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

Street Gangs — A return to Barbarism and the Dark Ages

At the end of the first century, or at the beginning of the second an unknown Christian moralist wrote an instructional tract known as the Didache. It begins as follows: “There are two ways, one of life and one of death, and there is a great difference between the two ways.”

 Recent events on the streets of Davenport demonstrate that that statement still rings true nearly 2000 years later. It puts in focus what happens when segments of society opt for “revenge,” rather than working within our criminal justice system, based on our U.S. Constitution. 

 

There is a fine line between a civilized society and barbarism. That line is crossed when citizens discard our criminal justice system, with its built-in safeguards for victims and defendants alike, and op instead for “revenge.” In doing so, the discard civilization and choose instead a “system” of survival of the fittest — might makes right —the ends justify the means. 

 

There was a time in human history, when there were no written laws and there were no courts to punish criminal acts. 

 

Moses and the Jewish people wandered for 40 years in the Sinai Desert. Moses realized that when the Jewish people reached the “Promised Land” they would need laws to punish murder, theft, perjury, and interference with established marital relationships. 

 

The Mayflower Compact of the Pilgrims was a similar acknowledgment. 

 

In the absence of the criminal law, to obtain justice for a wrong done, the injured party, his family, or his tribe relied upon “revenge.” Our newspapers daily show that that can happen even in a modern American city. Street gang killings are generally “revenge” killing. “Revenge” is their justification.

 

A recent Disptach front-page article by Tom Loewy, “It just a fact of life,” demonstrates the point. 

 

With no little effort the following facts can be extracted from the article. 

 

1. On May 19, 2018, 16-year-old Jovontia Jones was shot to death outside Hilltop Liquor,

during a drive-by shooting. No one has ever been charged in connection with his murder. 

[Note that his death is posited as the justification for the following criminal acts]. 

 

2. On Tuesday, May 22, 2023, John E. Hanes III was found guilty of the 2021 murder of Jamon Winfrey (age 14).

 

3. Nessiah Clark is presently on trial for the August 2022 attempted murder of Delmont Thomas. Clark is also charged with additional offenses, including possession of a firearm by a felon. 

 

To understand, how revenge fits into this equation, consider the following:

 

1. A woman present as a spectator at the trial of Nessiah Clark, identifying herself as Nessiah Clark’s mother, told Mr. Loewy, 

 

“I will say this: the violence of that day happened because of what happened in the past. Nobody shot anybody that day out of the blue, for no reason. Nessiah has been shot at before, and his half-brother (Aden), was shot at in the same incident. …. [D[id he carry a gun. Yes. he did. ….

 

“I would rather Nessiah to have a gun and not need it, rather than need a gun and not have it. … Maybe people don’t understand it, but there are killers out there. The threat of violence is very, very real for these yonng men. 

 

“It’s when he’s out on the streets, that I worry. Every time I hear sirens I wonder if he’s the one laying somewhere dead….”

 

2.. Davenport Police Sergeant Jordan Sanders said, Hanes was a member of the MMG. Street gang. Hanes fired on the car Whitney was in, because he believed members of Savage Life street gang. Sanders continued, “MMG and Savage Life had a “Shoot on sight” policy, when the spotted each other.”

 

3. According to Jovontia’s aunt, Sylvia Abbey, “MMG was basically a gang formed to avenge Jovi’s death.

 

 

Any rational writer or reader, of course, must be cautious when accepting the statements of street gang members, their family members, and their “associates.”. People who are willing to justify [revenge] murder, attempted murder, and possession of firearms by convicted felons, might just be inclined to lie when it serves their purposes. 

 

But my point is this: Street Gang Violence is a return to an age before criminal justice systems were known.  It is a return to survival of the fittest, and might makes right. It is a system which affords no rights whatsoever to the accused, and provides no safeguards for the innocent. Street gang violence, to be blunt, is a return to barbarism — and to the dark ages, where each killer is his own judge, jury and executioner.  

 

The people who eschew the criminal justice, turn their backs on assisting the police, and tolerate for street gang violence, deserve exactly what the get. 

 

Is it really possible to claim “Lives Matter” when guys with guns, probably acquired on the “Black Market,” gun down a 16-year-old boy standing outside liquor store? A 14-year-old-boy riding in a car? Another male outside a city gas station?

 

Is it really possible to claim that “Lives Matter” when rival gangs have a “Shoot on sight” policy? When a mother “would rather her son, a convicted felon, have a gun and not need it, rather than need a gun and not have it? And why did the convicted felon “need” a gun? Here, if the State’s allegations are true, he “needed” a gun to attempt murder.

 

The residents of a community have a choice There are two ways: The community can assist the police in bringing criminals to justice; or, they can put their trust in street-gang gunmen who operate a system of  “revenge.” 

 

I spent most of my professional life around police officers. A very few were not fit to be a police officer. But no cop that I have ever known has had “a shoot on sight policy” toward any group of people.

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on June 4, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

 

 

Prediction: Bail provisions of the Safe -T Act will be found to be unconstitutional

On Nov. 9, 2022, a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed by the states’ attorneys from 66 of 102 Illinois counties. Their petition for summary judgment alleged that Public Act 101-652, and how it was enacted, were in flagrant violation of the Illinois Constitution, and the act should be stricken as void in its entirety.

In December 2022, a judge in Kankakee County declared certain portions of the “so-called” Illinois Safe-T Act unconstitutional. The ruling dealt with portions of the Act limiting the power of judges to impose “cash bail” on those arrested for various criminal offenses.

The state then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court issued a stay of the lower court ruling, and heard arguments from the opposing sides in March 2022.

The 62 prosecutors put forth six arguments. I will address only two; they should be dispositive.

First: Because the act is not limited in scope to the “criminal law” even under a generous reading, it violates the single-subject clause set forth in Article IV, Section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution, and is void in its entirety.

The argument is that “reforming bail” is “criminal in nature.”

A state law pertaining to “whistleblowing,” applicable to 7,000 units of Illinois local government, isn’t “criminal in nature.” Nor is a law expanding the “Treatment Act” to other first responders. Nor is an act specifying how penitentiary prisoners must be counted for the purpose of determining representative districts. Nor is granting the attorney general increased powers to pursue civil actions, etc. for the court of claims.

The gist of the argument is this: “The “plain language of the act addresses multitudes of subjects with no natural or logical connection to criminal law. “

On this argument alone, the 62 prosecutors should win. Otherwise, the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution is a nullity. If they prevail on this argument, the court would not need consider the remaining arguments, because the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when the law violates the single subject clause, the entire law is struck down.

Second: By eliminating monetary bail and by creating a myriad of rules and strictures that severely restrict the exercise of judicial discretion to consider and assign appropriate weight to the most germane facts, the General Assembly encroached upon the inherent functions of the judiciary and violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution in Article II, Section 1.

Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution provides: “The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” The Illinois Supreme Court has held that if “power is judicial in character, the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising it. Judicial power is that which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens and to that end construes and applies the law.”

Legislative enactments undermining the “traditional and inherent” powers of the judicial branch, particularly, those restricting judicial discretion, violate the Separation of Powers Clause.

The Supreme Court has also recognized that “matters concerning court administration” fall within the inherent power of the judiciary, and the legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”

The Illinois Supreme Court has specifically held that bail is “administrative” in nature, and that the court has independent, inherent authority to deny or revoke bail to “preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”

The Supreme Court has held that the trial court had inherent discretion to hold the defendant in custody even though he was eligible for bail under the Illinois Constitution.

In Elrod, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the court has the ultimate authority in determining the appropriateness of bail. The defendant in Elrod was charged with non-capital murder and held without bail, even though the Illinois Constitution at the time imparted a right to bail to “all persons ... except for capital offenses.” The court began its analysis by stating:

“In our opinion, the constitutional right to bail must be qualified by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the conduct of the proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when such action is appropriate to preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.”

Although Public Act 101-652 does grant very limited authority to the court to enforce its pretrial release orders through sanctions, this does not cure the legislative overreach into the inherent powers of the judiciary. 725 ILCS 5/110–6. The legislature is “without power to specify how the judicial power shall be exercised under a given circumstance.”

The Illinois Supreme Court held that even though the Juvenile Court Act made no provision for the bail of an allegedly delinquent minor, the court had inherent power to set bail.

Since its beginnings, (in medieval England) the concept of bail has always involved money – whether cash, collateral, credit, or the conditional promise of payment by a surety. Requiring a “bond with sufficient sureties is premised on the assumption that economic loss to the accused, his family or friends, will assure his appearance for trial.”

Acting as a surety must involve some threat of loss and, accordingly, bail bonds secured by cash deposit or stocks and bonds equal in value to the bail are constitutional. Determining appropriate surety to compel the appearance of a defendant is a judicial, not a legislative function.

Argument two standing alone should also be dispositive of the case. I can’t imagine any judiciary ceding its constitutional authority and discretion to control bail to any legislature.


My prediction is that the trial judge will be affirmed.

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on May 30, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

Many owe Trump — and others damaged — a full, fair and very public apology.

“In short, the freedom and liberty of every American rests upon nothing more than a fragile understanding,” written on a 15-page scrap of paper” (the U.S. Constitution) John Donald O’Shea, Moline Dispatch, Dec. 1, 2014.

On May 12, 2023, John H. Durham, Special Council for the United States Department of Justice, submitted his report on matters related to intelligence activities and investigations arising out of the 2016 presidential campaigns to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland.

The 306-page report is a damning indictment of the conduct of the “top men” in our FBI and our intelligence agencies.

But will most Americans even consider reading its 13-page “Executive Summary?” Or is this a case of, “Don’t bother me with the facts; I already have made up my mind.”


In his Executive Summary, Durham writes:

“Based on the evidence gathered in multiple exhaustive and costly Federal investigations on the matter (including those of the U.S. House, the Inspector General, and Special Counsel Mueller), neither U.S. law enforcement nor the Intelligence Community appear to have possessed any actual evidence of collusion in their holdings at the commencement of Crossfire Hurricane investigation." 

 

“Our investigation also revealed that senior FBI personnel displayed a serious lack of analytical rigor towards the information that they received, especially information received from politically affiliated persons and entities. This information in part triggered and sustained Crossfire Hurricane and contributed to the subsequent need for Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. In particular, there was significant reliance on investigative leads provided or funded (directly or indirectly) by Trump's political opponents. The Department did not adequately examine or question these materials and the motivations of those providing them, even when, at about the same time, the Director of the FBI and others learned of significant and potentially contrary intelligence.”

The bottom line is this: the “Trump Collusion Claim” was a hoax, an attempt to frame President Trump, and a fraud upon the American people, which was begun with no basis in evidentiary facts, fueled by perjury and slovenly practice in pleadings before the FISA court, and funded, directly or indirectly, by operatives of the Hilary Clinton campaign, based on a dossier, with no basis in truth, that it paid for.

As a result of the fraud, the lives of innocent Americans — George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, and Gen. Flynn — were financially wrecked and their reputations destroyed, as they were indicted, publicly arrested, jailed, convicted on false testimony while exculpatory evidence was purposefully withheld.

President Trump was falsely labeled a “traitor,” and his administration was enmeshed in a web of lies and two impeachments over the course of four years. And the campaign of lies probably cost him the 2020 election.

And as all this was going on, a Democratic Congress, ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, the New York Times, the Washington Post and major newspapers throughout the nation, political spokesmen like Adm. Kirby, Twitter and Facebook all eschewed their independence and integrity. And most continued to “peddle the hoax” even after the Mueller Report found their was ‘no Russian collusion.”

For me, the last sentence of Durham’s “Executive Summary” seems to “say it all.”

“The promulgation of additional rules and regulations (to govern the FBI handling of such investigations) to be learned in yet more training sessions would likely prove to be a fruitless exercise if the FBI’s guiding principles of “fidelity, bravery and integrity” are not engrained in the hearts and minds of those sworn to meet the FBI mission of “Protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution of the United States.”

(Note the similarity of my 2014 quote, above).

So, what’s my suggestion to put an end to this monumental hoax and fraud upon the American people? How are the reputations of Donald Trump, et al to be restored? How do the likes of the NY Times, NBC, CNN, et al, ever regain their integrity, self-respect and public respect?

They publicly and unequivocally must confess their errors. Next, they must fully and unequivocally apologize to the American people, the victims of the baseless prosecutions, and to now private-citizen Donald J. Trump. If newspapers, they do so, with banner headlines, perhaps for a week straight. If TV or cable media, they do so, so openly and repeatedly — perhaps for a solid week — so that none of the regular viewers could miss their apologies,

There is a passage in the Act of the Apostles where Paul and Silas are deprived of their rights as Roman citizens, beaten, jailed and put in chains by the magistrates of Philippi. Then when the magistrates were apprised of their error, they personally went to the jail, and publicly made their apologies. No less should happen here.

Nor should this ever happen again in America. 

Any bets?

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on May 21, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea

If policy differences basis for termination, let voters know

On April 22, 2023, the Dispatch-Argus ran Olivia Allen’s article, “A ‘mutual’ separation for board, Lawrence,” on the paper’s front page. Perhaps, because I do not live within the Rock Island-Milan School District, I did not read the article.

I did not give the article a second-thought until a friend of mine at the golf course asked, “Why the school board got rid of the superintendent? And why did they agree to pay him $350,000?”

After having had to admit, that “I didn’t know,” and that “I hadn’t read the article,” I went back and read it.

In reading the article, I learned that Dr. Lawrence was the board’s superintendent, pursuant to a contract with the school board. Lawrence had served four years under his contract, and that his contract was not up for renewal until 2025.

I also learned that Dr. Lawrence’s performance as Superintendent had recently been evaluated, and that the Board discussed that with him at a closed meeting of the Board on March 21st. (A closed hearing for that purpose would be proper).

I further learned that Dr. Lawrence had not been “fired.” Rather, his contract had been terminated pursuant to the mutual agreement of Dr. Lawrence and the school board, with the board paying him $350,000 for Lawrence agreeing to the early termination. (I saw no problem with that, either).

In the words of Board President Terrell Williams, “The circumstances leading up to the contract termination were a “personnel matter, that the Board … will not comment on. …. (The goal was) always to do so amicably.”

But that was followed by the rather inexplicable comment by outgoing Board member, Tiffany Stoner-Harris: “(She) could see Lawrence being a great superintendent somewhere.”

So, why do you get rid of a superintendent who could be a “great superintendent somewhere?”

And why do you pay him $350,000 to go somewhere else, quickly?

Personally, I have no interest in whether Dr. Lawrence remains superintendent or not. I have never met the man, nor followed his handling of board’s affairs.

But the voters in the Rock Island-Milan School District do.

As an old Moline Corporation Council, before writing this, I spent four or five hours examining Illinois’ Open Meetings Law, in which the underlying “policy” is clearly stated:

“Policy. It is the public policy of this state that public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business, and that the people have a right to be informed as to the conduct of their business.

“In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and declares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.

“The General Assembly further declares it to be the public policy of this state that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.

“Exceptions to the public’s right to attend exist only in those limited circumstances where the General Assembly has specifically determined that the public interest would be clearly endangered or the personal privacy or guaranteed rights of individuals would be clearly in danger of invasion.

“To implement this policy, the General Assembly declares:

    (1) it is the intent of this act to protect the citizen’s right to know; and

    (2) the provision for exceptions to the open meetings requirements shall be strictly construed against closed meetings.”

The Board here appears to have properly closed the meeting under what is commonly called the “personnel exception:”

(a) Openness required. All meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) ….

(b) Construction of exceptions. The exceptions contained in subsection (c) are in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects within their scope. The exceptions authorize but do not require the holding of a closed meeting to discuss a subject included within an enumerated exception.

(c) Exceptions: A public body may hold closed meetings to consider the following subjects: The appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of specific employees ….

Here the meeting appears to have been properly closed to discuss “employment, compensation, … performance, and dismissal of a specific employee” — the superintendent.

Nobody, however, involved seemingly is making any claim that Dr. Lawrence’s “performance” was deficient in any substantial way that would justify his termination for cause. Rather as the board president indicated, it was a mutually agreed amicable termination. Indeed, Ms. Stoner-Harris states that she “Could see Lawrence being a great superintendent somewhere.”

Ms. Stoner-Harris' statement gives credence to Dr. Taylor’s comment that the termination came about because Dr. Lawrence did not see “eye to eye” with a majority of the Board members.

I think that my friend, and the school district's voters are entitled to know wherein the board and Dr. Lawrence did not see eye to eye. That is a matter of policy, and not within any exception to the Open Meetings Act. The voters are entitled to know where the board members stand on “policies” affecting the students of the district.

If issues of policy were in fact involved, it is difficult to see how, if a straight-forward joint statement was made setting out the differences between the Board Majority and Dr. Lawrence, “the public interest would be clearly endangered or the personal privacy or guaranteed fights of individuals would be clearly in danger of invasion.”

First Published in the Moline Dispatch and Rock Island Argus on May 7, 2023. 

Copyright 2023, John Donald O'Shea